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Beyond Containment: Redesigning American Policies

CHARLES WOLF, JR.

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THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

Beyond Containment: Redesigning American Policies

CHARLES WOLF, JR.

If "supply-side economics," despite its ambiguities, describes the underlying philosophy of the Reagan administration's economic policy, then "containment," notwithstanding the manifold ambiguities surrounding it, suggests the dominant theme behind the administration's foreign and defense policies.

The basic character of containment, in its 1981 incarnation, is similar to the original formulation of that doctrine nearly 35 years ago. Both the original description of the problem and prescription for its remedy remain relevant today.

Describing the international arena at that time, George Kennan asserted in his July 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," that the Soviet Union's "main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power." And Kennan's original policy prescription for coping with this situation was not very different from the current manifestation of that policy: "A policy . . . designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."

Of course, confronting the Soviet Union "with unalterable counterforce" is enormously more difficult in the 1980s than it was in the two decades following World War II. The principal reason is simply that the military power at the Soviet Union's disposal, as well as the indirect instruments of its power, have grown hugely in the intervening years. Expansion of the Soviet imperium into West Africa, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean during the past decade bears ample witness to the expanded scale of Soviet power.

A second reason it is currently so difficult to summon unalterable counterforce is that peace is not threatened solely by the Soviets. Even if adequate measures were available to counter Soviet power, they would not necessarily be sufficient in scope or appropriate in composition to cope with the myriad other forces that jeopardize peace and stability.

While this point has obvious merit, it is all too easy to exaggerate the differences between the non-Soviet destabilizing forces in the world environment today and those prevailing three decades ago. Recall, for example, that, at the time of the Kennan article, Turkey, Greece, and Iran were in the throes of internal nationalist and ethnic strife, the Indian subcontinent was ablaze with fanatical communal separatism, Indochina and Indonesia were in the midst of anticolonial,

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nationalist revolutions, and China was embroiled in a protracted civil war. "Peaceful and stable" were not more accurate terms for describing the world of Kennan's original containment article than they are in describing the world today.

As the new policy of containment has begun to emerge under the Reagan administration, it displays several elements.

As a general philosophy, the policy reflects a more severe, suspicious, and hostile stance against the expansion of Soviet military and political power, and the Soviet presence and influence around the world. Reflecting this stance, the new containment calls for substantially increased defense forces and budgets that raise defense spending by some $7 billion in 1982, $21 billion in 1983, and a total of $110 billion (in constant FY 1982 prices) in the following 3 years, with total obligational authority rising $34 billion in 1982, an additional $17 billion in 1983, and $105 billion in the next three years. These budget increases are programmed for strategic forces—the Trident submarine, the MX, and a manned strategic bomber—naval expansion to a 600-ship fleet, increased pay for military personnel, enhanced readiness, and war materiel. In addition, the program calls for the development and expansion of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and base facilities from which it might have to operate, especially in Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt. Of course, not all of these programs are new, but the increases in those that aren't new, as well as the accompanying mood, are distinctly different from those associated with the prior period of detente.

Besides these changes in U.S. defense planning, containment 1981 includes continued, if not increased, pressure on our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to expand their own defense efforts, partly to provide more realistic central front capabilities in Europe, and partly to enable U.S. forces and support capabilities in NATO to be used more flexibly outside the NATO treaty area, notably in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. Containment entails similar representations to the Japanese to increase their contributions to defense capabilities in Northeast Asia.

Although the precise foreign policy content of containment remains to be developed, its general outlines are suggested by several recent actions of the administration. One such action is the sharp "draw-the-line" position in El Salvador, calling upon the Soviet Union and its intermediaries in Cuba and Nicaragua to desist from providing military and financial support to leftist guerrillas fighting the military coalition junta. Another example is the administration's proposal to repeal the Clark Amendment, which prohibits covert U.S. assistance to resistance groups engaged in guerrilla war against the communist-supported regime in Angola.

Likewise the reemergence of entente between the United States and Pakistan is another indication of this new line. Presumably this development is intended to provide at least a modest increment of indirect support for the "freedom fighters" in Afghanistan. This entente entails a U.S. commitment of military and economic aid to Pakistan over several years; the duration is evidently as significant as the dollar amount, since the latter is at a rate only moderately greater than the offer originally made by the Carter administration and rejected by General Zia.

A final example of the developing content of containment is suggested by the option opened by the administration to contribute in limited ways to the strengthening of China's military capabilities.

In light of this pattern, removal of the embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union above the eight million ton threshold should probably be viewed as a digression for domestic political reasons, rather than a basic modification of the administration's containment stance.

THE ENVIRONMENT OF CONTAINMENT

Obviously, there have been profound changes in the international environment since Kennan's article appeared. The military power of the Soviet Union is vastly greater now than it was then: in strategic, tactical, and external projection forces and in conventional as well as nuclear forces. Its economic and technological capabilities have also greatly expanded: the Soviet gross national product (GNP) in 1980 was four to five times what it was in 1950.

At the same time, the weaknesses of the Soviet system are also much more obvious now in terms of sharply diminished growth rates, reduced factor productivity, and steadily rising capital-output ratios. Also, its internal demographic and political stresses and strains are currently more serious and visible than in the past.

Another fundamental change in the environment of containment in the 1980s is the enhanced economic and technological strength of Western Europe and Japan, although it is a strength that is nonetheless vulnerable and fragile. Their economic strength is suggested by the increased size of their national economies in 1979; the GNPs of Western Europe and Japan exceeded more than tenfold in real terms what they were in 1950, and as shares of the world's gross product their GNPs increased from less than 15 percent in 1950 to nearly 35 percent in 1979.

The fragility of this strength is reflected by the overwhelming dependence of these economies on imported oil that remains subject to abrupt interruptions—threatened as well as actual, and deliberate as well as inadvertent—over which Western Europe and Japan have little influence or control. Moreover, Western Europe's economic transactions with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—capital even more than trade transactions—have made several of the Western European countries, notably West Germany, at least limited "partners," if not hostages, of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Finally, the environment of containment in the 1980s has seen Kennan's "nooks and crannies" replaced by a turbulent, troubled, and troublesome Third World, though "multiple worlds" is really a more accurate term because of the extraordinary heterogeneity of these countries. They include some of the world's wealthiest countries, as well as some of the poorest; some of the most dramatically growing and modernizing countries, as well as the most stagnant ones; some with substantial military forces, capabilities, and experience, as well as some whose military forces are more like brigands than preservers of peace and order. Almost all of these countries have repressive, rather than democratic, regimes although their degrees of repressiveness vary widely. Finally, these "multiple worlds" also include at least one country, India, already possessing a nuclear capability, several countries whose efforts to develop such a capability are in varying stages of proximity to completion, and China, which has a limited nuclear delivery capability.

China itself presents a significant difference between the current environment of containment and that prevailing after World War II. It has become a vitriolic opponent of Soviet "hegemonism," presenting a source of uncertainty and concern on the Soviet Union's eastern border, which occupies the attention of over 46 Soviet divisions. In addition, China appears a watchful, perhaps hopeful, also suspicious and selective, participant in economic and political transactions with the United States and the rest of the world.

THE LIMITATIONS OF CONTAINMENT

In this complex environment, the administration's containment policy confronts limitations from the left and from the right. The former are reflected by the familiar and seri-

ous concerns of U.S. allies, especially West Germany and Japan. Their worry is that an active containment policy will impede or terminate the various channels of East-West communication developed through detente in the 1970s: notably the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), and especially the channels of trade, finance, and technology transactions. They fear that current trends may result in a serious deterioration in two dimensions. First, there may be a general cooling of East-West relations and, second, there may be a loss or diminution in economic benefits from trade, financial, and technological transactions with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

"[T]he Russians hit upon their formula for empire . . . by a combination of inadvertence and experience . . ."

Western Europe's exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1979 were $34.2 billion, representing 5 percent of its global exports. Western Europe's imports from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECOM) countries were slightly less—$33.8 billion, or 4.6 percent of its global imports. The net debt owed to the West by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1979 was approximately $65 billion, five times greater in real terms than the debt in 1971. The majority of this debt is owed to Western Europe.

A notable example of these expected benefits is provided by the negotiations between West Germany and the Soviet Union for construction of the Yamal pipeline. Under these arrangements, the FRG and other Western European countries will provide capital, equipment, and engineering technology to the Soviet Union for construction of a pipeline to bring natural gas from Western Siberia to Western Europe, providing between 15 and 30 percent of West Germany's consumption of natural gas by 1990.

The principal worry of our allies about hard-line containment has been somewhat eased by implementation of Secretary of State Alexander Haig's pledge to the NATO foreign ministers to open negotiations with the Soviet Union, aimed at reducing or terminating the planned deployment in Western Europe of 572 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, in exchange for reductions or withdrawal of SS-20 missiles and other Soviet theatre nuclear forces by the Soviet Union. Although the SALT II agreement is stillborn, there is a reasonable prospect that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union over reducing theatre nuclear forces will lead to, or merge with, a resumption of negotiations for reducing strategic arms. Indeed, merger between the two negotiations seems to have considerable merit, on technical grounds and perhaps on political grounds as well. For example, from the Soviet point of view, U.S. forward-based systems are capable of reaching the Soviet homeland, and from the U.S. point of view, the "mid-range" Backfire bomber with air refueling is capable of reaching the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the solemn worries of America's allies represent one source of tension and divisiveness within the alliance as

well as a source of opposition to containment by various liberal and left-leaning groups within the United States.

Containment is likewise limited by concerns from the right, which are both less familiar and less analyzed, but no less significant than those from the left. They result from a sharply different perspective on the changes in the international balance of power, and on the expansion of the Soviet empire during the past decade. Proponents of this perspective argue that the administration's containment policy is inadequate and misdirected for countering and reversing Soviet expansionism.

As a result of the Kremlin's efforts over the last decade the Soviet imperium now includes Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Benin, Madagascar, Congo-Brazzaville, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Syria, and Libya in addition to its previous satellites, allies, and associates in Eastern Europe, Cuba, and North Korea. Of course, the pattern and degree of political sway, control, and influence exercised by the Soviet Union varies considerably among the countries on this long list. Neverthless, all these instances fall within the "sliding scale of political terminology" covered by J.A. Hobson's use of the term "empire" in his classic study of nineteenth-century imperialism. While there have been some Soviet losses and setbacks (e.g., Somalia and Egypt) during this period, there is no question that the gains and extensions of the Soviet empire have vastly exceeded the losses and retrenchment.

This dramatic expansion has been accomplished through a skillful combination of military power, political adroitness, economic and financial support, and organizational inventiveness. It has proceeded through a series of innovative, pragmatic, and controlled operations. Generally they have been premised on two broad and general doctrinal positions whose loose rhetoric allows ample room for adaptation to specific opportunities and circumstances: the doctrine of support for "Wars of National Liberation" from Western colonialism-imperialism; and the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of Soviet support for "fraternal states" in which communism is threatened by imperialist and antisocialist movements.

Under the ideological guidance of these doctrines, the Soviet Union has successfully managed various policy instruments to expand its domain: providing trade subsidies for both imports and exports; extending economic assistance and direct financial support; furnishing grants and credits for weapons; providing airlift, sealift, and logistic support by Soviet military units; performing command, control, communications, and intelligence services in support of foreign operations; and developing and managing Cuban and East German proxy forces for combat, internal security, and police roles abroad. In these operations, Soviet combat forces have rarely been used directly. They are generally only a final, and usually disfavored, resource whose use is confined to such exceptional circumstances as Afghanistan.

The costs incurred by the Soviet Union in expanding and sustaining its empire have been large and growing. However, these imperial operations have been undertaken, with rare exceptions, selectively, flexibly, adroitly, cautiously, and deliberately. The success of these operations is profoundly puzzling because flexibility and adroitness are not characteristic of the Soviet system or its leadership, which are more typically associated with rigidity and regimentation.

My conjecture is that the Russians hit upon their formula for empire in the 1970s and 1980s by a combination of inadvertence and experience—contemporaneous experience, as well as the historical experience of imperial expansion in the nineteenth century. The contemporaneous experience that engendered the formula was Vietnam. From the Soviet viewpoint, Vietnam was a stroke of luck rather than a premeditated test of an emerging idea.

Soviet support for North Vietnam traversed the gamut of small weapons and materiel, vehicles, sophisticated air defense systems, and finance. It substantially upgraded an already effective fighting force, while imposing enormous military, economic, and political costs on the United States. Clearly, the effect of this experience was dramatic. Of course, Soviet support was not the only factor explaining the tragic process and bitter outcome in Vietnam. The operative factors were numerous and complex. Soviet support was only one among several important ones, and not the most important.

In any event, while some in the United States have tried to distill the lessons of Vietnam—in the process learning at least as many false as valid ones—the Kremlin learned one powerful one: If measured Soviet support for a well-trained and motivated North Vietnamese ally could produce such extraordinary results in South Vietnam, the same formula might be extended to other allies, in the process avoiding the risks of nuclear confrontation yet helping to advance the inevitable victory of communism.

This brings us to the question: How can the United States and countries associated with it devise an effective means for containing and reversing the growth of that empire?

From the standpoint of the conservative critics, the administration's emerging containment policy is insufficient and imprecisely calibrated for contesting and reversing the expanding Soviet empire. In effect, the components of the administration's containment policy, as outlined earlier, do not confront, or confront only obliquely, what the Soviet Union has actually been doing. Soviet operations have in fact been more subtle, flexible, and adroit than the countervailing measures that are proposed for dealing with them.

For example, use of the Rapid Deployment Force may be valuable in certain extreme contingencies, such as seizing and protecting oil production centers on the eastern or western side of the Persian Gulf, as well as shipping points along the Gulf. But such uses are likely to be rare. If attempts were made to use the RDF to meet the more likely and recurring appearance of Cuban and German proxy forces in such blurred, murky, and localized contingencies as Angola, South Yemen, and Ethiopia, let alone Cambodia, the effect would instead be to generate hostility abroad, and to lose political support at home. Yet these are precisely the kinds of contingencies that have arisen. For example, in the Caribbean and Latin America, these localized, small-scale contingencies have provided the opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its political sway and to pursue its aim of filling "every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power." And these are the kinds of contingencies likely to arise, and to provide similar opportunities in the next decade, as well.

Even if the RDF became—to paraphrase one former secretary of defense—more rapid, deployable, and forceful than it is likely to be during the next several years, even if our planned arrangements for obtaining facilities and base access in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf proceed successfully, and even if our traditional allies in NATO and Japan were more forthcoming in their incremental defense contributions, the administration's proposed containment policies would be profoundly insufficient and ill-suited to contain the expanding Soviet empire.

RESHAPING CONTAINMENT

The task of directly confronting the realities of Soviet imperial operations requires a combination of new declaratory policies, some reallocation of resources, organizational changes within the executive branch, altered policies for guiding the programming of economic and military aid, and changes in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Moreover, all of

these changes focus principally on U.S. policies and instruments in the Third World. Some of the changes are far-reaching and all of them clearly require more detailed planning and discussion than the brief outline presented here.

Declaratory Policies

Two innovations in U.S. declaratory policies are needed. The first is a declaration of explicit and overt yet selective, limited, and measured support for genuine and legitimate movements within the Third World seeking to achieve liberation from communist imperialism and totalitarianism. Like the Soviet doctrine of support for national liberation movements against Western imperialism, the doctrine of support for movements of national liberation from communist imperialism (MNLCI) should be overt and explicit—not, as implied by the proposed repeal of the Clark Amendment, principally directed toward *covert* assistance to liberation groups. But, equally important, such support should be limited in scope and magnitude, and confined to selected contingencies in which the legitimacy and demonstrated capabilities of a candidate movement show encouraging prospects for effective and successful utilization of the limited support. Yet it should be understood that there will be losses as well as gains. Only if it is clear that the outcome is uncertain can escalation be avoided, and public support maintained at home.

The second change would affirm a U.S. intention to collaborate with, and provide support for, associated countries whose interests converge with those of the United States in opposing the use of communist proxy forces in the Third World. These areas need be geographically no closer to the associated countries than the areas are to the Cuban and East German forces associated with the Soviet Union. The associated country forces (ACF) would become the free-world counter to Soviet use of proxy forces in the Third World.



The U.S. posture vis-à-vis the Soviet challenge should involve moderated expectations toward the direct involvement of our traditional allies, and prudent initiatives to elicit the collaboration of other associated countries; for example, Korea, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Taiwan, Brazil, and Venezuela.

Reallocation of Resources

The balance of forces in the strategic area, and in the NATO area, while not what we would like them to be, are nevertheless more stable and secure than in the Third World where a realistic and effective containment policy is more urgently required.

To implement the expanded and redirected containment policy proposed here, U.S. air and sealift forces should be specifically earmarked to provide mobility for forces from the associated countries referred to earlier. If the policy is to be taken seriously, and the U.S. role to be central and active, specific U.S. units should also be designated and exercised to provide resupply and logistic support, as well as command, control, communication, and intelligence support. These earmarked U.S. support forces should be configured and trained to operate in conjunction with the ACF, rather than operating principally or exclusively with U.S. forces as is proposed for the Rapid Deployment Force. While some of these units would clearly have joint capabilities to provide support for United States as well as third-country forces, specific training, including language training, as well as suitable equipment, will be essential for effective communications and operations. Prepositioning some of this supporting equipment in logistics-support ships located, for example, in the Indian Ocean, would be a useful part of this effort, particularly if the prepositioned equipment were periodically used in joint exercises with the ACF.

Effective support for movements seeking national liberation from communist imperialism will require intelligence capabilities to

scrutinize and evaluate the credentials—the strengths, weaknesses, legitimacy, and prospects—of aspiring liberation movements and groups in communist-governed outposts, such as Cuba, Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. Candidate groups that pass this rigorous screening will be eligible for light weapons designed for easy and speedy delivery by air and sea, as well as for easy maintenance and decentralized use. For example, such a policy would provide limited amounts of individually operated antitank and antiair weapons to Afghan "freedom fighters."

Hence it is critical that resources be allocated for the development of specific capabilities to operate jointly with ACF, and to provide selective, limited, and measured support for movements seeking liberation from communist imperialism if the proposed containment policy is to have any teeth. However, this is not a substitute for the Rapid Deployment Force; notwithstanding its acknowledged limitations, the RDF retains an essential function in several possible contingencies. Its function is to provide a backup, a protective carapace, to deter Soviet intervention, and to be committed only as a last resort in the event that Soviet forces are directly committed, or seem likely to be committed. Even in the absence of their direct use, the RDF would thus perform an invaluable role as a reassuring and protective guarantor for the ACF. Without such reassurance, the likelihood of ACF participation in the first place would be severely diminished.

Organizational Changes

The policies proposed above, and the types of operations that they envisage, require an organization with authority to span the military services. This group must be able to mobilize the multiple instruments of defense and foreign policy in conducting operations in support of associated country forces and those providing overt, but limited, support for movements of national liberation from communist imperialism.

These will require an organizational innovation to provide planning, command, control, communication, and intelligence; to call upon air and sealift, resupply and logistic support; to extend military and economic aid; and, in some cases, to provide direct financial support. No such centralized entity presently exists. The required functions are instead spread widely and loosely among the Defense Department, the State Department, and the intelligence community. To integrate them will require ingenuity and perseverance exercised within the context of the policy directives described above.

Programming of Military and Economic Assistance

The principal purpose of military aid programs—defined broadly to include foreign military sales, credit sales, and grant assistance—is to enhance the ability of nontraditional allies and friendly countries to provide for their own defense. This should also include developing and strengthening the local forces of certain recipient countries for potential use elsewhere in selected contingencies of mutual interest.

This objective would directly affect the conduct and content of U.S. military aid programs. For example, selected force elements in certain recipient countries would be configured for greater mobility by being equipped with lighter and more easily maintainable equipment. They would be trained and exercised to operate as expeditionary units outside their homelands, in conjunction with logistic support, air and sealift, and communications provided by designated U.S. support units.

The explicit and overt purpose of these forces in recipient countries, and of the special assistance provided to them under U.S. military aid programs, would be to counter Soviet efforts through Cuban and East German expeditionary units. In contrast to these two chosen instruments within the Soviet al-

liance system, the number of potential allies available to the United States is likely to be considerably larger, including Korea, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Taiwan (conceivably even with the concurrence, in certain circumstances, of the PRC), Brazil, and Venezuela. Clearly, the willingness of any of these countries to participate in any collaborative efforts with the United States would depend on the terms and conditions, including financial support from Washington, as well as on the location and circumstances surrounding the relevant contingencies.

One effective tool would be an innovation in the planning and conduct of U.S. foreign aid; namely, linking security assistance—that is, military aid in its various forms—with economic and technical aid for development purposes. Arguments about linkage have followed a cyclical pattern over the past 20 years, with the notion prevailing sometimes although more often—and currently—with those favoring a sharp separation between economic aid and military assistance in the ascendancy.

The case in favor of linking security assistance with development aid includes the following components. First, resources for military development and resources for economic development compete with one another, so it is appropriate and important for U.S. agencies responsible for conducting these programs to recognize and deal with these competing claims. Linking the planning and programming of the two forms of assistance would be a move in this direction. Moreover, there are obviously instances (the current example of assistance to Pakistan comes to mind in this connection) where economic assistance can encourage a government to join the associated country forces along the lines discussed earlier.

Second, in the process of facing up to these often competing claims, it is important to try to build institutions in Third World countries that are competent to recognize and analyze trade-offs and sometimes "trade-ons"—complementary as well as conflicting—between resources devoted to military development and resources devoted to economic development. Again, linking responsibility within the U.S. government for planning and programming of both forms of assistance can encourage analysis within the recipient countries.

"[T]he administration's containment policy... do[es] not confront, or confront[s] only obliquely, what the Soviet Union has actually been doing."

Third, opportunities often arise for using military resources, such as, manpower, training, communications, port facilities, airfields, engineering, and construction units, in civilian development, without impairing—indeed sometimes even enhancing—the military potential of these resources. These opportunities are more likely to be examined seriously, both within the U.S. planning and administration organizations and in the recipient countries, if the two functions are connected in the process of aid programming.

Finally, both security assistance and development assistance should be viewed as instruments of U.S. foreign policy, justified simply because they further U.S. interests rather than as ends in themselves. As instruments of U.S. foreign policy impinging on the Third World, and in light of U.S. interest in associated country forces, planning and implementing the programs together should

make them better able to achieve U.S. objectives.

The case against linking the two forms of assistance is strongly held and advocated by its adherents. First, there is often a tendency for military elites and organizations to be too strong, as well as too large, in many of the developing countries. If the two forms of U.S. assistance are merged within the U.S. government, the result may be a broader reach for the military in recipient countries, with a consequent undercutting of the competing claims for economic and social development, modernization, and meeting "basic human needs" in these countries. Separation of the responsible U.S. agencies would insulate development resources from the acquisitiveness and domination of the recipient countries' military.

Second, the image of the United States in some countries of the Third World already suffers from an excessive military taint. This impression would be reinforced by linking military and economic assistance. By contrast, a clean separation between the two enables the respective agencies in the U.S. government to participate in international meetings and conferences, together with counterpart agencies from Third World countries, without any compromising effects.

How might an appropriate balance be struck between these two schools? From the standpoint of advancing the objectives of U.S. foreign and defense policy, the arguments in favor of joining the programming and responsibility for economic and military assistance seem convincing. In considering other facets of U.S. foreign policy, the case for doing so is still persuasive, but the margin of preference is smaller.

Diplomacy and "Linkage"

The Soviet Union has asserted and reiterated that its support for wars of national liberation, and for Cuban and East German expeditionary forces in the Third World, is entirely compatible with "detente," arms limitation negotiations, and agreements on both the strategic and the European theater forces, and with the conduct of trade, financial, and technological transactions between East and West.[1]

There are persuasive reasons why the United States should adopt a stance along similar lines. U.S. support for movements of national liberation from communist imperialism and collaborative arrangements with associated countries furthering common interests in the Third World, is not incompatible with the pursuit of opportunities for mutual benefit between East and West in arms reduction and of economic, financial, and technological exchanges.

Such a position would be a balm for our alliance relations with NATO and Japan. It would also maintain channels of information and communication with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It would, at the same time, be an appropriate, if only partial, reflection of the criticisms of containment coming from the left.

However, there is an important asymmetry between conducting policy along these lines in a pluralistic democracy, and doing so in the relatively monolithic communist system. In the United States, the groups benefiting from the economic, financial, and technological transactions with the Soviet Union, as well as the arms limitation agreements, will become strong advocates of the expansion of these activities. They will also become hostages to conciliatory and concessionary behavior by the United States—a position that the Soviets may be able to manipulate to their advantage.

By contrast, the opportunities are exceedingly limited for the United States to strengthen, let alone manipulate, the influence of the doves in the Kremlin who supposedly see major benefits in detente. Indeed, the existence of this degree of pluralism in the Soviet system is arguably a figment of the sophisticated tastes of certain Western Kremlinologists.

How can the familiar notion of linkage in international affairs be related to an effective

containment policy along the lines proposed here? In the lexicon of diplomacy, linkage is no less ambiguous than containment. Linkage implies that the conduct and content of diplomacy in one domain (for example, arms limitations or trade negotiations) should be closely linked with the status and prospects of actions and relationships in other domains; for example, efforts by the Soviet Union or its proxies to foment trouble, terrorism, and instability in the Third World.

To say that there is nothing incompatible between the United States pursuing various detente relationships with the Soviet Union on the one hand, and adopting a more extensive and effective containment policy on the other, does not imply discarding linkage. In a fundamental sense, linkage is always desirable, in principle. Broadening the context in which aims and constraints, costs and benefits, can be served in diplomacy, widens the room for bargaining. Linkage in diplomacy thus provides opportunities for mutual advantage, in the same sense that multilateral and multicommodity trade affords greater opportunity for mutually beneficial transactions to take place than does bilateral or barter trade.

In attempting to effect more vigorous, extended, and aggressive containment policies, while at the same time maintaining an open and receptive stance toward the other dimensions of relationships with the Soviet Union, the United States is taking on a challenge as difficult as it is worthwhile. Doing so in a way that intelligently encompasses linkage is additionally worthwhile and difficult—and may in fact be beyond U.S. capabilities.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding its serious internal problems at home, and in Eastern Europe, the Soviet empire has persistently and significantly continued to expand over the past decade. It is a process that presents a corrosive threat to the values and interests of the United States and the Free World. Galvanizing a containment policy so as to meet this challenge would demonstrate to Soviet decision makers, as well as to the rest of the world, that the mixture of coercion and the waning ideological appeal of the Soviet system will not win a competitive struggle with the more flexible and pluralistic system represented by the United States and its associates. Moreover, the demonstration must confront the Soviet Union with the prospect of losing some of its recent gains if the competition proceeds.

What, then, lies beyond containment? On the one hand (the "left" hand if you will), there should be relationships, transactions, and negotiations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand (the "right" one), there should be vigorous and overt efforts, along the lines suggested above, not only to counter further expansion of the Soviet empire in the Third World, but to contest the expansion that has already occurred.

Scott Fitzgerald once observed that the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas at the same time and still retain the capacity for effective action. His observation suggests the challenge facing American policy in the 1980s.

NOTE

1. For an unambiguous reiteration of this position, see Henry Trofimenko, "The Third World and U.S.-Soviet Competition: A Soviet View," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1981, pp. 1027 ff.